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October 6 is a sad day in Hungarian history: 13 Hungarian freedom fighters against
Austrian rule were hanged on this day in 1849, following their conviction by a court
martial by Austrian forces. In addition to the military leaders of the 1848 Revolution,
Hungary’s first prime minister, Count Lajos Batthyany was also executed in Pest, in
an Austrian military garrison, on the same day. Hungary and Austria took until 1867
to settle the political relations of the dual monarchy through a historic compromise
(Ausgleich) — which the supporters of Hungarian independence saw as an instance
of liberal betrayal.
In 2020 the CJEU chose this day to hand down its long-awaited judgment on
restrictions on academic freedom imposed by the Hungarian government in
the spring of 2017 (C-66/18, Commission v Hungary). Inter alia, the Hungarian
government made the operation of foreign accredited universities in Hungary subject
to an international agreement signed by Hungary and the accrediting state and
also proof that the foreign university operated in its accrediting state. These new
rules applied to existing universities, including to my employer, Central European
University.
The CJEU found that the Hungarian law violates WTO law, and imposes
unacceptable restrictions on internal market freedoms such as freedom of
establishment (Article 49 TFEU) and the free movement of services (Article 16 of
Directive 2006/123/EC) and as such violates several Charter rights, among them
academic freedom (Article 13 CFR) and the freedom to found such institutions
(Articles 14(3) and 16 CFR). In doing so the CJEU echoed the initial concerns of the
Commission when it triggered the infringement process.
The CJEU’s judgment is the first major judicial pronouncement by a European
court on the institutional dimension of academic freedom as a fundamental human
right. The judgment is also worth a closer look, as it is a prime example of the
effectiveness of infringement action against illiberal practices undermining the rule
of law in the post-Weiss era. Finally, the judgment sheds light on the prospects of a
new line of action championed by the Commission, seeking to bring more life into the
Charter in the member states — to affect the daily lives of European citizens.
Meet academic freedom!
From the start the Commission was committed to making this infringement action
not only about various internal market freedoms, but — as much as the legal
framework permitted — about academic freedom and university autonomy. This was
a particularly challenging call because academic freedom as a human right is less
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developed in the European legal space than most scholars would dare to admit.
After all, when and where academic freedom is threatened, constitutional democracy
is under attack.
In this case the CJEU had to give life — and bite — to the Charter’s words
“Academic freedom shall be respected” (Article 13 CFR). The jurisprudence of the
ECtHR was admittedly not of much help: in Strasbourg jurisprudence academic
freedom is protected as an aspect of freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR) and it
is mostly engaged in cases concerning contributions made by individual academics
in the public debate (see paras. 224-225).
Changes in the legal regulation of the terms of accreditation of universities clearly
affect the institutional environment in which such individual academics work —
and conversely their academic freedom. This connection, however, had never
been made by a human rights court in Europe. The gap was pointed out in 2014 by
Judges Sajó, Vucinic and Kuris in a joint concurring opinion in Mustafa Erdogan v.
Turkey, emphasizing that “there can be no democratic society without free science
and free scholars. This interrelationship is particularly strong in the context of social
sciences and law, where scholarly discourse informs public discourse on public
matters including those directly related to government and politics.”
So far the Venice Commission provided the most detailed legal elaboration in its
opinion on the same Hungarian law (esp. paras. 42-51), drawing on a wide range
of soft law instruments on university autonomy developed in the Council of Europe
as well as the UN. The CJEU relied on the same sources (para. 227), agreeing with
Advocate-General Kokott that there is more to academic freedom than the freedom
of expression of university lecturers (para. 226). In doing so, the CJEU gave effect to
Article 13 of the Charter along lines that were previously not covered by the ECtHR.
Equally importantly, the CJEU followed the lead of the Advocate-General and
confirmed the logic of its earlier judgments in infringement cases concerning
illiberal constitutional engineering. In the earlier case of “foreign funded” NGOs
(C-78/18, Commission v Hungary) the CJEU pointed out that the violation of
freedom of association resulted from the deterrent effect of the rules, noting that
the regulation created “a generalised climate of mistrust vis-à-vis the associations
and foundations at issue, in Hungary, and to stigmatise them” (para. 118). In
the current case the CJEU assessed whether the new accreditation criteria had
the potential to undermine academic freedom (para. 228), and found that the legal
uncertainty created by the new rules limited academic freedom (para. 229). This is
exactly the kind of risk assessment that would be required under Article 7 TEU, in
defense of the Union’s founding values.
The CJEU found that the limitations were not justified, repeating its earlier findings
(para. 240) that (i) requiring an international agreement between Hungary and the
accrediting state created an opportunity for arbitrary governmental interference
with the operation of educational institutions (esp. para. 136), while (ii) the foreign
campus requirement is simply not suitable to prevent fraudulent practices in the
member state, despite claims of the Hungarian government to the contrary (esp.
para. 155).
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Human rights lawyers are likely to argue that the CJEU should have set out its
reasons in detail under the Charter, instead of just making a technical reference to
earlier findings. The approach followed by the CJEU, however, is consistent with the
overall manner in which the CJEU is comfortable with applying the Charter to the
actions of the member states in the infringement setting.
Infringement action as a tool against illiberal
constitutional engineering?
In response the Hungarian Minister of Justice Judit Varga repeated her earlier
point and accused the CJEU of applying double standards to Hungary (again),
but promised to “duly implement the judgment of the Court of Justice of the
European Union in accordance with the best interests of the Hungarian people.”
Infringement action has become the surprise weapon in the Commission’s rule of law
toolbox. Former Hungarian justice minister, Tibor Navracsics admitted recently that
the Hungarian government was caught by surprise when the Commission first
used infringement to this effect. The initial surprise is a thing of the past: over
the years the Hungarian government has built some defenses of its own, using
familiar components of the European constitutional architecture in service of illiberal
democracy.
To start, note how the Minister’s turn of phrase (in the translation quoted from the
Hungarian government’s website) is reminiscent of the language of a footnote to
GATS Article XIV invoked by the government: “The public order exception may be
invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the
fundamental interests of society.” The CJEU found that the Hungarian government
did not offer concrete and detailed arguments to substantiate such a defense (para.
131).
Recall that as soon as the infringement action reached the CJEU in 2018, the
Hungarian Constitutional Court suspended its proceedings in two pending cases
challenging the constitutionality of the Hungarian rules (3199/2018 (VI. 21.) AB ruling
–a petition by a group of MPs – and 3200/2018 (VI. 21.) AB ruling – a constitutional
complaint by CEU). The Hungarian Constitutional Court did so in the spirit of
European constitutional dialogue. As a concurring opinion by Justices Marosi and
Schanda makes clear: the Hungarian Constitutional Court will decide about the
constitutionality of challenged legal rules, irrespective of their compatibility with
EU law; in its assessment the Constitutional Court will be on the lookout to protect
Hungary’s constitutional identity (see 3199/2018 (VI. 21.) AB ruling, para. 18, and
3200/2018 (VI. 21.) AB ruling, para. 18).
Thus, following the judgment of the CJEU the Hungarian Constitutional Court
will have ample opportunity to assess the impact of these rules from a different
perspective, potentially taking into consideration factors concerning the ‘interests
of the Hungarian people’ that were not offered with sufficient precision and detail
before the CJEU. Academic freedom, as defined by the CJEU, will have to stand the
test of constitutional identity review by a packed constitutional court of an illiberal
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member state. With encouragement from the German Constitutional Court in Weiss,
the Hungarian response to the CJEU is likely to be another step towards unraveling
the European legal order.
Next step: Making the Charter matter in citizens’
daily lives
On October 5, 2020 Vice-President Jourova announced in the European
Parliament that later this year the Commission will unveil a new strategy regarding
the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the member states, with
special attention on the impact of the Charter in citizens’ daily lives.
Article 51 CFR has long been regarded as a major limitation on the application of the
Charter. In its more recent case law the CJEU confirmed that it will inquire into the
violation of Charter rights “where a Member State argues that a measure of which
it is the author and which restricts a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the FEU
Treaty is justified on the basis of that Treaty or by an overriding reason in the public
interest recognised by EU law, such a measure must be regarded as implementing
Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, such that it must comply
with the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter” (C-78/18, Commission v.
Hungary, para. 101 with further references; also C-66/18: para. 214).
Thus, the CJEU’s approach requires the finding of an additional violation of EU law
(e.g. the unjustified limitation of a fundamental freedom) to activate the protection
of the Charter against the actions of a member state. In her recent speech Vice
President Jourova did not provide details on how the Commission plans to navigate
the terms set by the Court. The Fundamental Rights Agency has monitored the
domestic application of the Charter for years. More recently, the Commission
commissioned a study on strategic litigation under the Charter – a report that
appears to be the first in a dedicated series.
Until we hear further from the Commission, a few words on what the violation
of Charter rights feels like in a citizen’s daily life. A year and a half into the saga
I admitted to feeling betrayed. Three and a half years later little has changed: justice
will be done, pending implementation of the CJEU’s landmark judgment by an
illiberal government.
So far the passage of time has benefitted the Hungarian government.
It provided room for delaying the entry into force of the new rules by a full year.
It also permitted them to sign international agreements regarding several foreign
universities, to be able to make the point before the CJEU that the new conditions
were not impossible to meet. In all this time, the Hungarian government did not
actually enforce the new rules once they entered into force: it did not revoke the
operating license of universities that did not meet the new rules (such as Central
European University). Thus, the university directly affected by the new rules did
not have direct legal recourse against government action — or a voice in the
legal proceedings that potentially determined its fate. For all this time government
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representatives could argue that “CEU was not pushed out of Hungary, it decided
to move away” and to find a new home in Vienna. The Hungarian government could
even present itself as a victim of unfounded criticism and liberal persecution: after
all, all they did was wait for the outcome of the infringement proceedings before the
CJEU.
Few victims of Charter rights violations can afford to wait several years to see justice
done, even fewer have the determination and funds to restart their life in a different
country — benefitting from freedom of movement and freedom of establishment
within the EU. The jury is still out on whether these freedoms will be enjoyed in a
constitutional democracy (in the ordinary sense of the word) in the Europe of illiberal
democrats.
This article was previously published on the BRIDGE network website.
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